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THAT a person who kills another without deliberation and premedita-
tion cannot be held liable for first degree murder would seem self-
evident under the usual statute defining the crime in terms of those
mental elements; and this would seem to be true whether the lack of
deliberation and premeditation was attributable to provoking circum-
stances, intoxication, mental disorder or any other cause.
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that in the case of mental dis-
order, the cases are almost evenly divided on whether or not such dis-
order may be considered in determining whether a killing was com-
mitted with deliberation and premeditation. Fully half of the courts
which have been confronted with the question have answered it in the
negative, most of them disposing of the problem in a paragraph or two.
They apply the doctrine that insanity is a defense only where the dis-
order is such as to come within the accepted "tests," and then it is a
complete defense, requiring acquittal. This doctrine recognizes no
middle ground between responsibility and irresponsibility, where
mental disorder not sufficient to require acquittal may nevertheless
serve to reduce the degree of the crime. In these states it would seem
that a person can be held guilty of committing a premeditated killing
even though he lacked the mental capacity to premeditate.
On the other hand, if the question is answered in the affirmative and
courts recognize mental disorder, short of legal insanity, as a defense
to the charge of first degree murder, the principle logically may extend
to the point where lack of the intent required to constitute the crime
supplants the accepted right-and-wrong test of criminal insanity.
Fisher v. United States 1 presented this problem to the United States
Supreme Court for the first time in 1946. Fisher was a Negro janitor in
the library of the Cathedral of St. Peter and St. Paul in Washington,
D. C. The librarian, Catherine Reardon, had complained to the verger
about Fisher's care of the premises, and the verger had told Fisher
about the complaint. On the morning of March 1, 1944, Miss Reardon
and Fisher were alone in the library. According to his account, she
scolded him and called him a "black nigger," whereupon he became
t Department of Justice; author of INSANrITY AS A DErEsE n; Cann=.-AL LAw.
*Superintendent, St. Elizabeths Hospital, Federal Security Agency, Washington,
D.C.; Professor of Psychiatry, George Washington University School of Medicine.
1. 328 U.S. 463 (1946), petition for rehearing denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 24 (Oct. 14, 1946).
See Taylor, Partial Insanity as Affecting the Degree of Critnc-A Commentary on Fisher
v. United States, 34 CAIa. L. REv. 625 (1946) ; Note, 46 Cot. L. Rsv. 1005 (1946).
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angry and struck her. She ran screaming toward a window and Fisher
rushed out of the room. Her screams continued. Fisher saw a pile of
wood, seized a piece, ran back, and struck her on the head. The stick
broke and he seized her by the throat and choked her to silence. He
then dragged her to a lavatory and left her there while he went back to
clean up the spots of blood. She screamed again and Fisher returned
to the lavatory and stuck her in the throat with his pocket knife
(merely through the skin, the coroner said). She was silent then and
he dragged the body down into an adjoining pump pit where it was
found next day. He never wanted to kill Miss Reardon, he said, but
only wanted to stop her screaming, which unnerved him.
The defense tried to show that the killing was not deliberate and
premeditated, and was, therefore, only second degree murder. Although
evidence of the accused's psychopathic tendencies, low emotional
response and borderline mental deficiency was introduced, the trial
court refused to instruct the jurors that they could consider these fac-
tors in determining whether Fisher was guilty of murder in the first
or second degree. Acting under instructions defining accepted tests of
insanity, malice, deliberation and premeditation, the jury found the
defendant guilty of murder with deliberate and premeditated malice.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the con-
viction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The only error
urged by petitioner was the trial judge's refusal of an instruction which
would have permitted the jury to weigh evidence of mental deficiencies
-- admittedly short of insanity in the sense of irresponsibility for crime
under accepted tests-in determining the fact of, and the accused's
capacity for, premeditation and deliberation.
In a 5-3 decision the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's refusal
to give the requested instruction. The majority, speaking through
Justice Reed, discussed first the instructions actually given by the
trial court and found them without error. The Court went on to say
"The jury might not have reached the result it did if the theory of
partial responsibility for his acts which the petitioner urges had been
submitted." 2 But under the law of the District of Columbia, as estab-
lished in United States v. Lee,' the Court found that the accused was
not entitled to an instruction on this theory, and it declined to force the
District of Columbia to adopt a contrary rule. The majority stated
that it expressed no "opinion upon whether the theory for which peti-
2. Id. at 470. The term "partial responsibility" although it has been used by writers,
including one of the authors of this article, is misleading. The theory does not contem-
plate that any offender should be held only "partially" responsible for his crimes. It con-
templates full responsibility, but only for the crime actually committed. A better phrase
would be mental disorder affecting the degree of crime, or mental disorder affecting the
particular intent.
3. 4 Mackey 489 (Sup. Ct. D. C. 1886).
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tioner contends should or should not be made the law of the District of
Columbia. Such a radical departure from common law concepts is
more properly a subject for the exercise of legislative power or at least
for the discretion of the courts of the District." 4
Justices Murphy, Frankfurter 5 and Rutledge 0 wrote dissenting
opinions. The most important for the purposes of this article is that of
Justice Murphy, because it is concurred in by the other two dissenters,
and because it most directly discusses the question, which, as Justice
Murphy phrases it, is: "May mental deficiency not amounting to com-
plete insanity properly be considered by the jury in determining
whether a homicide has been committed with the deliberation and
premeditation necessary to constitute first degree murder?"
His answer is a vigorous affirmative. He points out that "between
the two extremes of 'sanity' and 'insanity' lies every shade of dis-
ordered or deficient mental condition, grading imperceptibly into one
another," and that there are persons who, while not totally insane,
possess such low mental powers as to be incapable of the deliberation
and premeditation requisite to statutory first degree murder. "Com-
mon sense and logic recoil" at a rule which requires the jury either to
condemn such persons to death on the false premise that they are
mentally capable of committing first degree murder, or to free them
completely from criminal responsibility.'
On careful analysis the Fisher decision appears to be more of a vic-
tory than a defeat for the proposition that partial insanity may reduce
the degree of a crime. It is true that the majority of the Court found
no error in the trial judge's failure to give an instruction based on this
theory. But the Court did not deny its soundness. The majority found
it unnecessary to express any opinion on whether the theory should or
should not be made the law of the District of Columbia. Three of the
eight justices, on the other hand, believed it should. Thus, the first
case in which the Supreme Court has considered the theory found three
-of the justices wholly favorable and five non-committal. For a doctrine
4. 328U.S.463,476 (1946).
5.. Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that Fisher's "whole behavior seems that of
a man of primitive emotions reacting to the sudden stimulus of insult and proceeding
from that point without purpose or design.' Id. at 481. The dissent stated that in the
particular circumstances of the case, it was the responsibility of the trial court to bring
sharply and vividly to the jury's mind the crucial issue whether the requisite premeditation
was in fact present or absent. Instead, "the instructions to the jury on the vital issue of
-premeditation consisted of threadbare generalities, a jumble of empty abstractions equally
suitable for any other charge of murder with none of the elements that are distinctive
:about this case, mingled with talk about mental disease.' Id. at 487.
6. 'Air. justice Rutledge concurred in the dissent by Mr. Justice Murphy and in a
separate opinion also agreed with Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view that the crucial issues of
-deliberation and premeditation were not adequately pointed up.
7. Id. at 494.
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which has won approval from only half of the state courts to which it
has been presented, this is a step forward.
II
The new prominence given by the Fisher case to the theory that
mental disorder may affect the degree of a crime will almost certainly
result in its being urged more often and more articulately than it has
been hitherto. Indeed, it seems strange that the doctrine has not been
asserted more often in the past, for this is no alien notion at war with
common law concepts. It is merely an application in cases of mental
disorder of the recognized general principle of our law that the state of
mind with which a person commits a criminal act is important in deter-
mining not only whether he should be punished therefor, but also, if he
is to be punished, how severely. Ordinarily, a person is not punished
criminally unless he did the act with some wrongful state of mind. This
fundamental principle of criminal justice is at least as old as Christian
ethics." Some acts we punish only if done with specific intent to do that
very act; others we punish even if done with an intent to do something
nearly as bad; still others we punish even if there was no intent to do
anything wrongful at all, but merely a high degree of carelessness. We
also have a growing body of statutory crimes in which intent is wholly
irrelevant, but these still constitute merely a minor exception to the rule
that we do not punish criminally unless there is a concurrence of act and
intent. The word "intent," although commonly used in this connection,
is not a very apt term to describe the mental element requisite for each
crime, covering as it does not only the specific intent necessary in some
crimes, and the general intent to do wrong which is sufficient in other
crimes, but also criminal negligence, which should not properly be called
"intent" at all.
If the mental state requisite to a given crime is absent, the crime has
not been committed. To what cause the absence of such mental state is
to be attributed would seem immaterial. Intoxication furnishes the best
example. Intoxication is not a circumstance that excites any sympathy.
Unless involuntary, it is no defense to criminal liability. Nevertheless, if
it is proved that a defendant charged with a deliberate and premeditated
killing was too drunk at the time to deliberate and premeditate, he can-
not be convicted of first degree murder; he must be convicted, if at all,
of some lesser degree of homicide, not because we countenance drunk-
enness as a mitigating circumstance, but because he did not commit the
8. HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 143-7 (1947) ; 2 HOLDSWORTt, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 53 (1895) ; 2 POLLocH and MAIThAND, HISTORY OF ENGLIS LAW 474-5
(1895); Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, HARVARD
LssAL ESSAYs 399, 401 (1934) ; Crotty, The History 'of Insanity as a Defense to Crime in
English Criminal Law, 12 CALm. L. REv. 105, 110 (1924).
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more serious crime.9 If we are willing to recognize this reasoning in the
instance of intoxication, why not apply the principle in any situation
where for any reason the defendant is in fact incapable of forming or
entertaining the state of mind requisite to the crime charged? The Su-
preme Court itself stated the rule in an early intoxication case, Hopt v.
People: 10
"But when a statute establishing different degrees of murder
requires deliberate premeditation in order to constitute murder in
the first degree, the question whether the accused is in such condi-
tion of mind, by reason of drunkenness or otherwise, as to be capable
of deliberate premeditation, necessarily becomes a material subject
of consideration by the jury." (Italics added.) n
A number of state courts have similarly used language broad enough to
include insanity as well as intoxication. 12
In insanity cases mechanical application of the accepted "tests"
often obscures the essential principle upon which they are based: that a
person should not be punished for a crime if, for any reason, he did not
entertain the state of mind requisite to constitute the crime. Yet when
jurists take time to state their major premises, this fundamental ra-
tionale inevitably presents itself. In the early leading case of Common-
wealth v. Rogers,13 Chief Justice Shaw began his charge to the jury
with the observation, "In order to constitute a crime, a person must
9. "Intoxication. is admissible in such cases, not as an excuse for crime, not in miti-
gation of punishment, but as tending to show that the less and not the greater offense was
in fact committed." State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136 (1873). Accord: Pirtle v. State, 28
Tenn. 663, 670 (1849).
10. 104 U.S. 631, 634 (1881).
11. In the Fisher case, Mr. Justice Reed, after referring to the Hopt case, says:
"It should be noted, however, that the Territory of Utah had a statute specifically estab-
lishing such a rule." This was true, but the statement quoted above was not made with
reference to that statute; rather it was based expressly on the statute dividing murder
into degrees and requiring deliberate premeditation to constitute murder in the first degree
-a form of statute in effect in the District of Columbia no less than in Utah.
12. People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544, 545 (1863) ; People v. Brislane, 295 Ill. 241, 247,
129 N.E. 185, 187 (1920) ("whether from intoxication or any other causes") ; People v.
Walker, 38 Mich. 156, 158 (1878) (if "for any reason whatever" accused did not indulge
the criminal intent, crime was not committed) ; State v. Garvey, 11 Minn. 154, 163 (1866)
(insanity of any kind or from any cause rendering accused incapable of forming intent, is
admissible to prove him innocent of that crime) ; Wilson v. State, 60 N.J.L. 171, 37 At.
428 (1897) ("drunkenness or any other cause"); Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio 555, 556
(1846) ("any state or condition of the person that is adverse to the proper exercise of the
-mind") ; Commonwealth v. Hillman, 1S9 Pa. 548, 42 At. 196 (1899) ; Pirtle v. State, 2
Tenn. 663, 670 (1849) ("drunkenness or other cause"). See also Johnson v. State, 24
.So.2d 228, 230 (Ala. 1945), where it was said: It is not the province or purpose of the
law to hold a totally irresponsible person, a person of disordered and deranged mind
(without reference to the cause of such condition), accountable for his acts."
13. 48 Mass. 500, 501 (1884).
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have intelligence and capacity enough to have a criminal intent and
purpose." However, as Professor Keedy pointed out in analyzing this
famous charge, 14 Chief Justice Shaw promptly moved to a somewhat
confused discussion of mental phenomena instead of following his state-
ment with a discussion of the concept of criminal intent.
In 1869, in Stevens v. State,' 5 the Indiana court said, "In a criminal
case the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the de-
fendant's mental capacity to commit the crime charged. This is but
an application of the general principle that the criminal intent must be
proved, as well as the act; that without a capable mind such intent
cannot exist, the very element of crime being lacking." Similar state-
ments can be found in other cases.'1 In New ampshire and apparently
also in Montana, this principle has been held to constitute the entire
law ori the subject, all "tests" for its application being rejected as
matter for scientific proof, and not for legal rules. 7
If insanity is a defense because it negatives the state of mind requisite
to the crime charged, there is no logical escape from the proposition
that if the defendant, because of mental disorders short of insanity, was
incapable of premeditating and deliberating the killing and in fact did
not deliberate or premeditate, he cannot be guilty of a crime which by
definition requires these mental elements. If, however, he was able to
understand the nature of the act he was committing and if he intended
to do that act, understanding that it would certainly or probably
cause death, he should be found guilty of murder in the second degree
or manslaughter. There is no logic in the "all or nothing" assumption
underlying our usual thinking on the effect of mental disorder on crim-
inal responsibility-the assumption that a person .is either "sane" and
consequently fully responsible for all his acts, or else "insane" and
wholly irresponsible.
The reason why defense counsel have not urged the proposition more
often can only be surmised. The most probable reason would seem to
be that they have been distracted by the "tests" of insanity, which
purport to be comprehensive and to cover the subject. Counsel are
14. Keedy, Insanity and Criminal iResponsibility, 30 HARv. L. REy. 535 and 724, 727
(1917).
15. 31 Ind. 485, 491 (1869).
16. State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 Pac. 641 (1909) ("Since a criminal intent is an
essential element of crime, if by reason of insanity a person is incapable of forming any
intent, he cannot be regarded as guilty by law.") See Hotema v. United States, 186 U.S.
413,417-9 (1902) ; United States v. Fore, 38 F. Supp. 140, 141 (S. D. Cal. 1941) ; 1 Bxsnop,
CRImINAL LAW § 381(2) (9th ed. 1923) ; 2 STmHEN, HISTORY OF TuE CmmiNAi. LAW OF
ENGLAND 97 (1883) ; 15 HAZv. L. REV. 499 (1902).
17. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869) ; State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871) ; State v.
Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 59 Pac. 169 (1899) ; State v. Keerl, 29 Mont. 508, 75 Pac. 362 (1904) ;
State v. Crowe, 39 Mont. 174, 102 Pac. 579 (1909) ; State v. Marich, 92 Mont. 17, 9 P.2d
477 (1932).
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therefore led to try to prove that their clients come within the test, and
to assume that unless they can so prove, mental abnormality is ir-
relevant.
III
Justice Reed, in the majority opinion in the Fisher case lists six-teen
cases as having adopted the rule and twenty-four as having rejected it.
Careful reading of these cases reveals that some are distinguishable in
that they do not actually involve or even discuss this issue, and others
discuss it merely in dicta. Grouping the cases (those cited by the
Supreme Court plus a few not cited) by states, the writers would clas-
sify them as follows:
Arizona,18 Idaho 19 and Missouri ^-1 have rejected the rule and so, per-
haps, have California,2' the District of Columbia,22 Massachusetts, -5
Nevada, 24 New Jersey 25 and Pennsylvania, - although it is possible to
18. Foster v. State, 37 Ariz. 281, 289-90, 294 Pac. 268, 270-1 (1930).
19. State v. Van Vlack, 57 Idaho 316, 360-7, 65 P.2d 736, 750-1 (1937).
20. State v. Halloway, 156 Mo. 222, 231, 56 SAV. 734, 736 (1900).
21. People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 46, 273 Pac. 767, 772 (1928) (strictly, only ques-
tion involved was whether, under statute providing for separate trials on insanity and
other issues, court was correct in excluding all evidence of mental condition on trial of the
zain issue; held, yes) ; People v. French, 12 Cal. 2d 720, 738, 87 P2d 1014, 1023 (1939)
(does not involve rule in question, but only contention that defendant's mental condition
might be considered by the jury in determining what punishment to assess if defendant
was found guilty of murder in the first degree, under California statute giing the jury
discretion to fix punishment at death or life imprisonment) ; People v. Cordova, 14 Cal2d
308, 311-2, 94 P2d 40, 42 (1939) (involves solely an attack upon constitutionality of Cali-
fornia statutes providing for separate trial of sanity from other issues). Cf. People v.
Belencia, 21 Cal. 544, 545 (1863) (in determining degree of murder, "any evidence tending
to show the mental status of the defendant" held admissible).
22. United States v. Lee, 4 Mackey 489 (Sup. Ct D. C. 186).
23. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 219 Mass. 1, 5, 106 N.E. 545, 547 (1914) (instruction
based on the theory, "except as covered by the instructions," held properly denied; instruc-
tions given told jury that "defendant could not be convicted if from mental disease he vas
unable to form a criminal intent or purpose, and acted under an irresistible impulse").
Cf. Commonwealth v. Clark. 292 Mass. 409, 198 N.F 641 (1935).
24. State v. Skaug, 161 P.2d 708 (Nev. 1945). In this case, an instruction prhap3
based on the theory but poorly worded and not supported by citation of authorities, was
held properly refused.
25. State v. Rodia, 132 N.J.L. 199, 39 A.2d 484 (1944) (trial court had commented
adversely on testimony of experts as to defendant's mental age introduced to show that
he was incapable of planning, premeditating or designing with intent to kill Held, 9-7,
judge's right to comment was dear. Minority deemed the comment prejudicial error; the
testimony had been properly admitted, for the degree of mental capacity may "be a deter-
mining factor on the issue of the e.istence of a deliberate and premeditated design to
ldll") ; State v. Noel, 102 N.J.L. 659, 676-7, 133 At. 274, 279-SO (1926) (conviction re-
versed because court felt defendant did not know nature of the act or difference between
right and wrong; no clear discussion in majority opinion of the rule regarding reduction
in degree; minority, concurring, specifically favors the rule) ; State v. James, 96 N.J.L
132, 149-51, 114 Atl. 553, 560-1 (1921) (involved use of evidence of mental condition as
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distinguish most of the cases from these jurisdictions. Arkansas,21
Texas 2 and Washington,21 although represented among the cases
a basis for jury recommendation of life imprisonment statute; rule regarding reduction in
degree of crime not involved) ; State v. Maioni, 78 N.J.L. 339, 74 Atl. 526 (1909) (in-
struction that insanity cannot reduce crime from first degree to second degree murder up-
held). Cf. Wilson v. State, 60 N.J.L. 171, 37 Atl. 428 (1897) (if, "by reason of drunken-
ness or any other cause," prisoner is incapable of deliberation and premeditation, the crime
has not been committed) ; State v. Close, 106 N.J.L. 321, 148 Atl. 764 (1930) sculble.
26. Commonwealth v. Hollinger, 190 Pa. 155, 160, 42 At. 548, 550-1 (1899) ; Com-
monwealth v. Scott, 14 Pa. D. & C. 191, 196-8 (1930). See Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 121
Pa. 586, 592-3 (1888) (questions regarding defendant's temperament, disposition, excit-
ability, and whether these influenced his mind so that he was incapable of deliberating
and premeditating held properly excluded; "the evil dispositions of a defendant were not
admissible in evidence for the purpose of excusing or mitigating his crime") ; Common-
wealth v. Wireback, 190" Pa. 138, 151-2, 42 Atl. 542, 546-7 (1899) (question of insanity
reducing degree of crime not involved; the following dictum is pertinent: "To say that a
man is insane to an extent which incapacitates him from fully forming an intent to take
life, yet enables him to fully and maliciously form an intent to do great bodily harm
without a purpose to take life, is absurd, for the one involves the same test of responsi-
bility as the other, the ability to distinguish between right and wrong") ; Commonwealth v.
Heidler, 191 Pa. 375, 43 Atl. 211 (1899) (also involves only burden of proof; court quotes
Wireback case; a dictum on a dictum) ; Commonwealth v. Barner, 199 Pa. 335, 342, 49
AtI. 60, 64 (1901) (semble); Commonwealth v. Szachewicz, 303 Pa. 410, 416-7, 154
Ati. 483 (1931) (dictum).
The proposition denied as absurd in the Wireback case has little resemblance to the
theory involved in the rule that mental disorder may affect the degree of crime. In the
court's example, the mental state requisite to the two crimes is essentially the same-in-
tent to take life and intent to do great bodily harm. There is greater difference between
the mental state of deliberately and premeditatively taking life and doing so with "malice
aforethought" but without deliberation and premeditation.
In a number of cases, the Pennsylvania court has expressly or tacitly approved in-
structions that if the self-governing power was wanting, by reason of intoxication or in-
sanity, the accused cannot be said to have deliberated or premeditated in the sense required
for first degree murder. Nevling v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 322 (1881) ; Commonwealth v.
Werling, 164 Pa. 559, 30 Atl. 406 (1894); Commonwealth v. Hillman, 189 Pa, 548, 42
Atl. 196 (1899) ; and see Commonwealth v. Sherer, 266 Pa. 210, 109 Atl. 867 (1920);
Jones v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 403 (1874).
27. In Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 558, 180 S.W. 186, 197 (1915), an instruction for
the state, objected to by defendant, was held misleading "and highly prejudicial to the
defendant" The case does not deny that a defendant might be entitled to such an instruc-
tion properly worded.
28. Hogue v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. 539, 542, 146 S.W. 905, 907 (1912) contained a dic-
tum that: "This court has never recognized the doctrine that a person with a mind below
normal should be punished for a lower grade of offense if found guilty than a person of
normal mind .... Evidence may be introduced for the purpose of showing defendant's
state of mind, as establishing his intent and fixing the grade of the offense, but if a person
has sufficient intelligence to know right from wrong he is legally responsible for his acts."
This seems to accept rather than reject the rule that mental unsoundness may be shown
to negative criminal intent. Witty v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. 440, 171 S.W. 229 (1914) merely
held that delusions of threats against defendant and his family, which had excited his
mind, would not prevent conviction of murder; and is not in point.
29. State v. Schneider, 158 Wash. 504, 291 Pac. 1093 (1930) involved only a question
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cited as olposing the rule, cannot properly be included, for the cases
from these states are dearly distinguishable.
Connecticut, 30 Illinois,31 Utah, 32 Virginia,33 and Wisconsin 34 have
more or less clearly adopted the rule, and perhaps Indiana 35 and Ken-
tucky 36 too. Maryland 37 and New York 35 in dicta have also approved
the rule. In addition, the courts of Alabama, Michigan, Iinnesota,
of pleading: "whether defendant could raise defense of reduction of crime under a special
plea of insanity and mental irresponsibility." The court did not discuss the merits of the
defense.
30. Anderson v. State, 43 Conn. 514, 526 (1876); State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136,
143-4 (1873) ; State v. Saxon, 87 Conn. 5, 86 At. 590 (1913).
31. Fisher v. People, 23 Ill. 283 (1860) ; and see People Y. Brislane, 295 II. 241,
247, 129 N.F. 185, 198 (1920) (if accused, at time of act, "was wholly incapable of form-
ing the intent charged, whether from intoxication or any other cause, he is guilty of no
crime").
32. State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071 (1915); State v. Green, 78 Utah
580, 6 P2d 177 (1931).
33. Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867 (1831).
34. Hempton v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N.W. 596 (1901); Obom v. State, 143 Wis.
249, 126 N.W. 737 (1910).
35. Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 356, 24 N.E. 123, 126 (1889) ; Donahue v. State,
165 Ind. 148, 156, 74 N.E. 996, 999 (1905). In Sage v. State, 91 Ind. 141 (1883), the court
properly rejected a requested instruction to the effect that if defendant was "partially" in-
sane, he might be found guilty in a less degree than charged. But the court also added
that "independently of any question of insanity the defendant in a criminal cause has the
right to have his general physical as well as his mental condition at the time of the com-
mission of the supposed crime explained to the jury, so as to put them in possession of all
the facts connected with the transaction, and the better to enable them to judge of its
character." In Robinson v. State, 113 Ind. 510, 513, 16 N.E. 184, 186 (1887), it vas said
that while weakmindedness is no defense, it is "to be considered as bearing upon the in-
tent with which he took the property."
36. Rogers v. Commonwealth, 96 Ky. 24, 27 S.W. 813 (1894) ; Mangrum v. State, 19
Ky. Law Rep. 94 (1897). But see Perciful v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 673, 678, 279 SAV.
1062, 1064 (1925) (defendant convicted of murder alleged error in refusing a manslaugh-
ter instruction; held, there was no evidence of "heat of passion" or other factors showing
manslaughter, and "as insanity excuses altogether... proof of insanity other than drunken-
ness would not authorize a manslaughter instruction").
37. Spencer v. State, 69 Aid. 28, 41-3 (1888). The trial court refused to admit
evidence that defendant had been restless and nervous, etc., his counsel having refused to
give assurance that this would be followed up by other proof tending to show insanity at
time of the homicide, and no specific object having been avowed for offering the evidence.
In the Supreme Court, it was argued that one ground of admissibility was that the evi-
dence affected the degree of the crime. The court conceded the principle relied upon, but
held that here, all the evidence, including defendant's, showed the most deliberate premedita-
tion and that the evidence was correctly excluded.
38. See People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 180, 163 N.E. 553 (1928). But cf. Sindram
v. People, 88 N.Y. 196, 200-201 (1882) (no "insanity" involved, but only contention that
court should have admitted certain lay testimony of defendant's peculiarities and passion-
ate character; held: ". .. the theory that eccentricities of character or inordinate pas-
sion can render a sane man incapable of committing an offense which involves deliberation
is wholly inadmissible!').
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Ohio and Tennessee, as well as the, United States Supreme Court 39
have in intoxication cases employed broad language to the effect that
if the accused, because of drunkenness or otherwise, did not have the
requisite state of mind, he cannot be held guilty of the crime charged.
Most of the courts which reject the theory adopt the "all or nothing"
reasoning referred to above. 0 United States v. Lee, cited by the Supreme
Court in the Fisher case as having established the law for the District
of Columbia, is typical. The trial court in that case had refused to in-
struct the jury that if they found such mental unsoundness as to render
the defendant incapable of premeditation and of forming such an intent
as would be imputed to a sane man, they could weigh such unsoundness
in determining whether the act was murder or manslaughter. The
District of Columbia law at that time did not divide the crime of
murder into degrees, and the prosecuting attorney in the Lee case
emphasized this fact in his argument.
"In jurisdictions where murder is divided into two degrees-
murder in the first degree requiring deliberation and premeditation;
in other words, actual malice-it has been frequently held that
evidence of mental excitement resulting from drunkenness and,
perhaps, also of other abnormal conditions of the mind not amount-
ing to insanity, may reduce an unprovoked homicide to murder in
the second degree; but it has always been held that such evidence
cannot of itself reduce the crime to manslaughter." 41
The Supreme Court of the District affirmed the conviction and held
that the requested instruction was correctly refused, stating two
grounds. The first was that "there was no evidence whatsoever upon
wlb'ch to found the prayer." The only evidence offered by the defense
on the subject of insanity was that of lay witnesses who testified that
on the day of the killing the defendant acted "like he was crazy," that
he had been drinking frequently for several weeks, and that after the
shooting he appeared as though he had been drinking. No one testified
to an opinion that he was insane. On the evidentiary ground alone,
therefore, the court was certainly justified in holding that the instruc-
tion was properly refused.
But the court voiced a second criticism: that the requested instruc-
tion was "incongruous and radically vicious," because "It rests upon
the idea that there is a grade of insanity not sufficient to acquit the
39. See notes 10 and 12 mpra.
40. Foster v. State, 37 Ariz. 281, 289-0, 294 Pac. 268, 271 (1930) ; People v. Troche,
206 Cal. 35, 46, 273 Pac. 767, 772 (1928) ; United States v. Lee, 4 Mackey 489 (Sup. Ct.
D.C. 1886) ; Commonwealth v. Cooper, 219 Mass. 1, 5, 106 N.E. 545, 547 (1914) ; State v.
Holloway, 156 Mo. 222, 231, 56 S.W. 734, 736 (1900) ; State v. Maioni, 78 NJ.L. 339, 74
AUt. 526 (1909).
41. United States v. Lee, 4 Mackey 489, 493 (Sup. Ct. D.C. 1886).
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party of the crime of manslaughter and yet sufficient to acquit him of
the crime of murder." The law, said the court, does not recognize any
such distinction; the test is knowledge of right and wrong, and if the
accused could distinguish between right and wrong so as to be guilty of
manslaughter he surely could do so with respect to murder.
The Lee case can be distinguished on two grounds: (1) the first reason
stated by the District Supreme Court being sufficient, the second was
merely surplusage; (2) the contention that mental abnormality may
reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter is different from the
contention that it may reduce it from murder in the first degree to
murder in the second degree; the Lee case had involved only the former
contention, while the Fisher case involved the latter.
The Supreme Court in the Fisher case specifically rejected this second
suggested distinction. "As capacity of a defendant to have malice,"
said Mr. Justice Reed, "would depend upon the same kind of evidence
and instruction which is urged here, it cannot properly be said that the
separation of murder into degrees introduced a new situation into the
law of the District of Columbia." 42
This can only be regarded as an unconsidered statement which the
Court would hardly undertake to uphold on fuller analysis. A defend-
ant's capacity for malice aforethought does not depend upon the same
evidence as does his capacity for deliberation and premeditation. The
murder-manslaughter distinction has a wholly different history and is
based on wholly different criteria from those involved in distinguishing
degrees of murder. The former is of common law origin, the latter
statutory; the former involves an objective test, the latter subjective.
43
The provocation which at common law reduces a homicide to man-
slaughter must be such as is calculated to produce hot blood or passion
in a reasonable man, an average man of ordinary self-control. 4" Unless
42. 328 U.S. 463, 473.
43. On the historical development of "malice aforethought" into a concept wholly gov-
erned by ex-ternal, objective criteria, see Communication to the Legislature, N.Y. Law
Revision Commission, Leg. Doc. (1937) No. 65, pp. 536-40, quoted in HAS. and GLUE=-.,
CAsEs oN Cinr Ax. LAW 83 (1940).
44. This is all that is held by most of the cases cited by Mr. Justice Reed. Hart v.
United States, 130 F.2d 456 (App. D.C. 1942); Bishop v. United States, 107 F2d 297
(App. D.C. 1939); McHargue v. Commonwealth, 231 Ky. 82, 21 S. r2d 115 (1929). The
McHargue case was not only dearly restricted to the murder-manslaughter distinction, but
was decided in a jurisdiction where the division of murder into degrees does not exist. The
Bishwp case goes further, and holds directly contra to Mr. Justice Reed's statement quoted
above. The court said that capacity to have malice does not depend upoa the same lind
of evidence and instruction required in distinguishing first and second degree murder. In-
toxication "may negative the ability of the defendant to form the specific intent to kill, or
the deliberation or premeditation necessary to constitute first degree murder, in which
event there is a reduction to second degree murder," but "as between the two offenses of
murder in the second degree, and manslaughter, the drunkenness of the offender can form
no legitimate matter of inquiry," for to constitute manslaughter, "it is only necessary to
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it meets this objective standard of reasonableness, the subjective fact of
passion does not make the killing manslaughter. Such factors as men-
tal abnormality or intoxication are therefore irrelevant, since the "rea-
sonable man" standard postulates a sane and sober man. 45 But the
statutes dividing murder into degrees require by definition that for
first degree murder the prosecution prove the actual existence of pre-
meditation and deliberation. 46 In determining the existence of these
mental elements, abnormality, peculiarity, aberration, drunkenness,
fatigue or any other condition tending to disprove their existence is
admissible in evidence and should be taken into consideration.4"
The distinction between these two doctrines has been maintained by
the District of Columbia courts themselves. Subsequent to the Lee
case, the crime of murder was divided into degrees by statute, and
under that statute it has been held that evidence of intoxication render-
ing the accused incapable of deliberate premeditation requires an in-
struction that, if so incapacitated, he cannot be convicted of first
degree murder.48 Prior to the adoption of the statute, intoxication was
no defense to common law murder."
Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge in the Fisher case both called
attention to the fact that the Lee case involved only the murder-
manslaughter distinction and not the then non-existent distinction
show that the killing was committed in 'heat of passion' upon sufficient provocation, The
test of sufficiency of such provocation is that which would cause an ordinary man, a rea-
sonable man, or an average man, to become so aroused." Bishop v. United States, supra,
at 135-6.
Of the four cases cited by Mr. Justice Reed, only one supports his statement, State v.
Eaton, 154 S.W.2d 767 (Mo. 1941)-in the sense that the Missouri court there also failed
to observe the distinction between the two doctrines. Other courts have at times been
guilty of the same confusion. See, e.g., State v. Gounagias, 88 Wash. 304, 153 Pac. 9
(1915), holding that evidence of provocation insufficient to reduce homicide to manslaugh-
ter was ipso facto insufficient to reduce it from first to second degree murder; and State
v. Holmes, 12 Wash. 169, 40 Pac. 735 (1895).
45. Rex v. Lesbini [1914] 3 K.B. 1116; People v. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288 (1883), aft'd,
110 U.S. 516; Upstone v. People, 109 Ill. 169 (1883) ; Gustavenson v. State, 10 Wyo. 300,
68 Pac. 1006 (1902).
46. Unless the prosecution proves deliberation and premeditation, the inference is that
a killing with malice aforethought is murder in the second degree. State v. Friedrich, 4
Wash. 204, 29 Pac. 1055 (1892). The "felony murders" also included in first degree mur-
der are not involved in the problem discussed in this article and for present purposes can
be disregarded.
47. A leading case applying the correct rule is People v. Caruso, 246 N.Y. 437, 159
N.E. 390 (1927). See also cases cited note 58 infra; WHARTON, CmImINAL LAw § 516
(12th ed.) The point discussed in this paragraph was called to the writers' attention by
Professor Sheldon Glueck of the Harvard Law School who has kindly read a draft of
this article.
48. McAffee v. United States, 111 F.2d 199, 205 n.15 App. D.C. 1940.
49. Bishop v. United States, 107 F.2d 297, 301 (App. D.C. 1939).
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between murder in the first and murder in the second degree1 9 The
majority cited no case in which the District courts had held that the
effect of the new code provision was restricted to intoxication cases.
Thus, the case which the majority relied upon as establishing a rule of
local law "long established and deeply rooted" was based upon a
statute now superseded by a statute of a type which the prosecution
in that case conceded would have justified a different result. The
statutory revision admittedly changed the prior rule so far as intoica-
tion is concerned and its effect as to the logically similar defense of partial
insanity had not previously been passed upon by the local courts.
But accepting the Lee case as establishing a rule, its reasoning is the
"no middle ground" argument stated above, found also in half a dozen
cases from other jurisdictions. The fallacy in this reasoning lies in
allowing the "test" of insanity to overshadow the fundamental prin-
ciple of which the test is merely a rule-of-thumb application. The
principle, as already stated, is that a person who is mentally incapable
of entertaining the wrongful state of mind required to constitute a
crime should not be held guilty of that crime. As specific tests for the
application of this principle became crystallized, judges tended to ap-
ply the tests mechanically, without regard to their rationale. It is a
common phenomenon. Infancy and compulsion, like insanity, are also
defenses resting on the premise that they negative criminal intent or
wrongful state of mind, even though each has its own little body of
rules or "tests." In the defense of mistake of fact, too, as Austin has
pointed out, although the proximate ground is ignorance or error, the
ultimate ground is the absence of unlawful intention or unlawful in-
advertence. 51 In the administration of all these defenses, concentrating
attention on the "tests," the rules of thumb, causes us to lose sight of
the basic proposition on which the rules are premised.
52
50. 328 U.S. 463, 489 n.ll. Justice Rutledge stated that he did not think that Con-
gress, by introducing the requirements of premeditation and deliberation into the District
Code, intended to change the preexisting law only in cases of intoxication.
51. AusTrN, JuRispRUDENcE § 687 (Campbell ed. 1875). See also Keedy, Ignorance
and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARv. L. REv. 75 (1903).
52. This tendency has been peculiarly fostered in insanity cases by the impressive au-
thority of the opinion in M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark and Fin. 200 (1843) in which all
the judges of England, upon Parliamentary request, undertook in an advisory opinion to
formulate the specific terms in which the question should be left to the jury. Prior to this
opinion, although ability to distinguish right from wrong had been pointed to as a criterion
in determining sanity, it had been in the course of general discussion, more as an example
or illustration than as a rule or exclusive test. Where knowledge of right and wrong was
not felt to be the appropriate test, other criteria were used, as in Hadfield's Case, 27 How.
St. Tr. 1281 (K.B. 1800).
There Hadfield, who had been wounded in the head and discharged from the army on
the ground of insanity, was charged with shooting at King George IIL His counsel, Lord
Erskine, told the jury that Hadfield suffered from delusions that, like Jesus Christ, he was
to sacrifice himself for the world's salvation; because he would not commit suicide, which
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Granting for present purposes the validity of the accepted tests for
their intended purpose-namely, that of providing a specific criterion
by which the jury may determine whether a defendant is so disordered
as to be wholly irresponsible for crime-pointing to such tests is no
answer to the basic question: how can one justify holding a person
guilty of a deliberate and premeditated killing when he did not deliber-
ate and premeditate, and, indeed, was incapable of deliberating and
premeditating?
IV
Only two cases, strangely enough, refer to practical difficulties as
reasons for not considering mental disorder as affecting the degree of a
crime. In Commonwealth v. Hollinger,"3 the Pennsylvania court stated
the problem as follows:
"The courts do not ask the jury to undertake the impossible task
of discriminating between degrees of insanity so as to find a prisoner
incapable of forming a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill,
while he has still so much sanity that he is a person of sound mem-
ory and discretion, as he must be to be guilty of murder even in
the second degree."
The other case adopting this reasoning, State v. Van Vlack, 11 is almost
the only decision rejecting the theory in which there is a careful exami-
nation of its merits. There, the Idaho court argued as follows: the
theory assumes that the accepted right and wrong test is an adequate
test for malice aforethought, since that is the test universally applied;
if a person under the accepted test possesses ability to entertain malice
aforethought, the theory contended for must be based upon two propo-
sitions, first, that one must possess greater mentality to deliberate and
premeditate than to possess malice aforethought, and second, there
must be some standard for determining whether the individual pos-
sesses such added mental ability. "It is therefore," the court said, "not
he deemed wrong, he shot at the King so that "by the appearance of crime his life might
be taken away from him by others." Id. at 1321. The defense was stopped and the jury
returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Stephen has pointed out how the right-and-wrong test was slighted in that case. "In
this case Hadfield clearly knew the nature of his act, namely, that he was firing a loaded
horse pistol at George III. He also knew the quality of his act, namely, that it was what
the law calls high treason. He also knew that it was wrong (in the sense of being forbid-
den by law), for the very object for which he did it was that he might be put to death
so that the world might be saved; and his reluctance to commit suicide shows he had
some moral sentiments." 2 STEPHWr, HISTORY OF THE CumrIrAL LAw 159 (1883).
53. 190 Pa. 155, 160 (1899).
54. 57 Idaho 316, 65 P.2d 736 (1937). A Pennsylvania lower court decision also
contains a carefully considered discussion of the question. Commonwealth v. Scott, 14 Pa.
D. & C. 191 (1930).
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a question of partial insanity but of mental ability." 51 This comment
alone shows a clearer comprehension of the argument than is shown by
older cases which dispose of the matter by refusing to recognize any
"middle ground" of "partial insanity."
The Idaho court's first argument against the instruction requested in
the Van Vlack case was that it "would have compelled the jury to find
the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree even though he
had not sufficient mentality to have malice aforethought." This sug-
gestion must have come as a surprise to defendant's counsel, who
surely had no such thought.5s In support of this criticism the court
mistakenly cited State v. Saxon, 7 a case which is actually an authority
supporting the defendant's theory. The point, however, need not be
considered further for it is at most a mere matter of proper wording of
the instruction.
A second criticism was that the instruction "proceeds upon the un-
justified theory that there is a distinction between the amount of mental
ability necessary in premeditation and deliberation, and malice." The
Idaho court denied that such a "refinement" is possible and denied that
any case holds that a mind capable of entertaining malice aforethought
is incapable of premeditation and deliberation. But although the court
distinguished certain cases, it ignored others which apply the very
Itrefinement" considered impossible.,3 Among these cases is a Con-
55. State v. Van Vlack, 57 Idaho 316, 362, 65 P.2d 736, 757 (1937).
56. It comes as a surprise also to one of the present writers. The instruction re-
quested, as the court said, was taken almost verbatim from WEmoFm&, INSA-r- AS A Dz-
FENsE IN CtnirIAL LAWV 101 (1933). The wording there used was certainly not intended to
lend any support to the notion that a person might be guilty of murder in the second degree
even though he had no malice aforethought
57. 87 Conn. 5, 86 AtI 590 (1913).
58. E.g., Anderson v. State, 43 Conn. 514 (1876) (defendant convicted of first degree
murder granted new trial because of doubt whether he was a proper subject of capital
punishment: "The.burden was on the state to show not only that the prisoner was capable
of committing a crime, but that he was in a condition to plan and execute a cool, deliber-
ate murder. The degree of malice essential to murder in the first degree, like the act of
killing, or any other material fact, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, or the jury
ought not to convict of the greater offense. Upon that point the jury might have enter-
tained a reasonable doubt, and at the same time may have been satisfied that the act was
a crime and that it was their duty to convict of murder in the second degree." Id. at
517-8) ; State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071 (1915) (first degree rpurder con-
viction reversed where evidence showed that defendant v.as an epileptic, who had been
drinking heavily and who was always badly affected by liquor; jury should have been
instructed to consider this evidence in determining appellant's mental capacity to Aeliberate
and premeditate. "While one's mental condition may not excuse the act, it may neverthe-
less affect the degree of guilt." Id. at 145); State v. Fenilk, 45 R.I. 309, 121 At. 218
(1923) (evidence that defendant, though not insane, was not in his normal mental state
held "relevant on the question of the fidty and duration of the conscious intent or premedi-
tation").
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necticut decision, 59 citation to which is found in the Idaho court's own
opinion. 
4
A third reasbn put forth in Stdte v. Van Vlack for rejecting the re-
quested instruction was that there was no demarcation made in the
testimony between ability to entertain malice aforethought or delibera-
tion and premeditation. The medical evidence presented on behalf of
the defense was that defendant did not know right from wrong, and
suffered from a delusion and a manic depressive form of insanity. There
was no evidence and no standard by which the jury could determine
whether defendant had that greater degree of mentality required to
deliberate and premeditate.
This was a point of evidence. The requested instruction was not
supported by the evidence as summarized by the court. This ground
was enough to support the decision, and the remainder of what the
court said may tenably be deemed unnecessary to the decision and
therefore dicta.
Thus the only one of the Idaho court's three criticisms which has
.general validity is the denial that it is possible to make a distinction
between the amount of mental ability necessary for premeditation and
deliberation and that necessary for malice aforethought. It must be
admitted that court decisions in most states have defined the concepts
of "deliberation" and "premeditation" so narrowly that it is almost
impossible to understand (much less to get a jury to understand) just
what the distinction is between first-degree and second-degree murder."0
But if the courts have tended to confuse what the legislatures have
tried to keep distinct, they should not use confusion they have created
as an argument against the statutory distinction.
In a minority of jurisdictions, moreover, the courts have kept the
line drawn by the legislatures fairly clear, by defining premeditation to
consist of entertaining in the mind a design to kill, formed prior to the
killing; and deliberation to mean "a thinking over with calm and re-
flective mind" of the considerations for and against the killing. 1
These definitions seem to agree with what the legislatures obviously
59. Anderson v. State, 43 Conn. 514 (1876).
60. In the great majority of states, it is held that neither calmness nor any appre-
ciable interval of time is necessary for deliberation or premeditation. The cases are re-
viewed in Michael and Wechsler, A Rationale of ihe Law of Homicide, 37 CoL. L. REV.
701, 707-8 (1937) and in Knutson, Murder by the Clock, 24 WAsH. U. L. Q. 305 (1939).
"The elimination of these elements leaves, as Judge Cardozo pointed out, nothing precise
as the crucial state of mind but intention to kill." Michael and Wechsler, siepra at 708.
61. Torres v. State, 39 N.M. 191, 43 P.2d 929 (1935) ; Ex parte Simpson, 37 N.M. 453,
24 P.2d 291 (1933) ; State v. Kotovsky 74 Mo. 247 (1881) (in deliberation, "Inclination
to do the act is considered, weighed, pondered upon") ; State v. Speyer, 207 Mo. 540, 106
S.W. 505 (1907) (deliberation "is intended to characterize what are ordinarily termed
cold-blooded murders"); but see State v. Young, 314 Mo. 612, 286 S.W. 29 (1926) ; Win-
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had in mind-a definition which restricts first degree murder to what a
layman would call a "cold-blooded" killing.
The concepts of premeditation and deliberation, like others known
to the law, stem from the days of "faculty psychology," when mental
processes were neatly tagged as belonging either to the "will," the
"reason" or the "emotions." With the recent advances in our under-
standing of mental processes, it has become increasingly clear that the
ideal "rational man" is considerably rarer than we had thought and
that the emotions and needs-fear, anger, the desire for power or gain--
are far more potent as driving forces than had formerly been recog-
nized. The mind, as the generic term used to denote the totality of the
manner in which the human organism adapts itself to situations, cannot
be considered apart from the body, and therefore not only the heredity,
the early environment, the education and native intelligence, but also
the physical state, the functioning of the ductless glands, the presence
of infection or intoxication are factors in determining the reaction of the
individual to any given circumstance. Any of these factors may play a
part in modifying the degree to which planning or intellection (pre-
meditation or deliberation) can be applied to a situation and in many
conditions short of "insanity" these elements may be psychologically
important.
The degree to which socially-approved conduct or response to situa-
tions is found depends in considerable measure on the temperament of
the actor, the development of his inhibitions, his ability to look ahead
to consequences as opposed to "hair-trigger" action, and therefore on
his set of conduct, his intelligence, and the soundness of his central
nervous system.
To the scientist no less than to the man in the street, the distinction
between the mental state which is deemed so reprehensible as to make
killifig properly a capital offense, and the mental state which is deemed
to call for a lesser punishment, is no mere "refinement" but a very real
and significant distinction.
It may well be difficult in some cases to say with certainty that the
accused, although not so seriously disordered as to come within the
right-and-wrong or the irresistible impulse test, nevertheless was in-
capable, under the circumstances of the case, of premeditating or
deliberating the killing. But mere difficulty of application is a dubious
ton v. State, 151 Tenn. 177, 268 S.V. 633 (1925) (act must be done "coolly and in the ab-
sence of passion").
In the District of Columbia, "some appreciable time must elapse" to have deliberate
and premeditated malice. Bullock v. United States, 122 F.2d 213 (App. D.C. 1941).
The Oregon Code specifically provides that deliberation and premeditation shall be
evidenced "by poisoning, lying in wait, or some other proof that the design vms formed
and matured in cool blood, and not hastily upon the occasion." OM_. CoDE A:.::. §§ 23-414
(1940).
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ground for denying an otherwise allowable defense to crime. Mental
abnormality is a condition which can be diagnosed only by experts,
functioning under scientifically valid procedures. There is much room
for improvement in the procedures employed by the law in determining
the facts in insanity cases whether the rule under discussion be adopted
or not. It should not be assumed that it is less difficult to determine
knowledge of right and wrong or the existence of an irresistible impulse.
02
As Justice Murphy said in the Fisher case:
". .. juries constantly must judge the baffling psychological
factors of deliberation and premeditation, Congress having en-
trusted the ascertainment of those factors to the good sense of
juries. It seems senseless to shut the door on the assistance which
medicine and psychiatry can give in regard to these matters, how-
ever inexact and incomplete that assistance may presently be. Pre-
cluding the consideration of mental deficiency only makes the
jury's decision on deliberation and premeditation less intelligent
and trustworthy." 63
Moreover, the assistance which medicine and psychiatry can give
may in some cases be reasonably complete and convincing. In the
Fisher case itself, the evidence adduced by the defense, according to
the transcript of record filed with the petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court of the United States, was to the effect that Fisher had
left school at the age of 14, having then reached the third grade; that
his mental age by intelligence tests was eleven years four months; that
he had been treated for syphilis; that he had neurological and serologi-
cal evidence (as shown by changes in certain reflexes and in tests of the
spinal fluid) of syphilis of the brain; that he had been a heavy drinker
for fourteen years, and that on the night before the murder he had been
drinking heavily'. A psychiatrist who had made several examinations
of Fisher testified that he was an impulsive and aggressive psychopath.
In other words, the defendant, already of inferior intelligence and of an
impulsive makeup, had suffered damage to his inhibiting, controlling
and thinking mechanism, his brain, by reason of both alcohol and
syphilis. In the light of these facts, every student of human behavior
would agree with Justice Frankfurter's lucid summarization: "His
whole behavior seems that of a man of primitive emotions reacting to
the sudden stimulus of insult and proceeding from that point without
purpose or design." 64
It should be recorded that the prosecution's rebuttal consisted in
presenting a psychiatrist who had not examined the defendant and who
testified that on the basis of what he had heard of the testimony the
62. See State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 600, 6 P.2d 177, 185 (1931).
63. 328 U.S. 463, 493.
64. Id. at 481.
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defendant was "of sound mind," but that "he was very mad and there
was provocation." His evidence is summed up in the Supreme Court's
majority opinion: "The prosecution had competent evidence that peti-
tioner was capable of understanding the nature and quality of his
acts." 65 But if the question of the effect of the defendant's mental con-
"dition on his ability to deliberate and premeditate had been adequately
presented, the majority admitted that "the jury might not have
reached the result it did. . ... Quite likely not. Even a lay jury
would probably doubt the ability of a pathological specimen, such as
Fisher was shown by uncontroverted medical evidence to be, in the
stress of an emotional situation to act "coolly and in the absence of
passion," orto "weigh and ponder upon" his actions.
V
The paucity of reasons advanced by the courts rejecting the rule
that mental disorder may serve to reduce the degree of a crime does not
mean that the rule is relatively unassailable. Some possible objections
exist which have not been mentioned in judicial opinions.
It may be urged that if mental disorder, not justifying an acquittal on
the ground of insanity, may be used to reduce an offense to a lower
degree or to a lesser crime, juries may misuse this doctrine. They may
reach compromise verdicts in cases where they are not certain of a
defendant's sanity, or where they cannot agree on a clear-cut verdict
of guilt or innocence. Since juries already have wide powers to convict
in a lower degree or for a lesser crime than that charged, and in some
states even to fix the punishment, or to determine both the law and the
facts, the possibility of compromise verdicts is already so great that
opening an additional door will make little difference. The possibility
that the jury may misuse this rule in a case where it is not properly
applicable is not a good reason for refusing to permit them to apply
it in cases where it is legally and logically proper. Such refusal, in a
case where the accused is mentally defective, though not to such a
serious degree as to require a full acquittal, requires the jury to punish
the accused either more severely than the circumstances justify, or not
at all. The jury in such circumstances, if they feel that his mental
abnormality played a part in his conduct, will often bring in verdicts
of not guilty by reason of insanity, even though they are not convinced
that the accepted tests have been met. Such verdicts are wrong, but
when courts give juries only the alternatives of black and white, who
is to blame for wrong results in judging the grays?
Another possible objection is that the rule, if sound at all, is not
limited in application to reducing first degree murder to second degree,
65. Id. at 467.
66. Id. at 470.
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but logically extends to all crimes requiring a specific or even general
criminal intent, and that adoption of the rule would thus involve a
radical revision of the law governing insanity as a defense to crime.
There seem to be few cases in which mental disorder has been ad-
vanced as negativing the intent requisite to any particular crime ex-
cept first degree murder.67 But the rationale of the rule extends to all
crimes involving either specific or general intent, including negligent
crimes,6" and excluding only those statutory crimes in which no wrong-
ful state of mind is required. Although the rule is usually stated as
being applicable only to crimes requiring specific intent, a few cases
have held that drunkenness may also be shown to negative malice
aforethought, and so to reduce a killing to manslaughter. 9
But if the rule is extended to other cases than murder in the first
degree, it would in effect set up a new test of insanity, supplementing
the accepted right-and-wrong and irresistible impulse tests. The new
test would be: was the defendant, at the time of the act charged, suffer-
ing from mental unsoundness which prevented him from entertaining
the mens rea, or criminal intent, which is requisite to constitute the
crime?
Such a test was proposed some years ago as a substitute for the exist-
ing tests by a committee of the American Institute of Criminal Law
and Crinlinology composed of some of the country's most eminent
authorities in criminal law and psychiatry. Professor Edwin R. Keedy,
chairman of the committee, ably urged the merits of such a test. As he
pointed out, this test was in accordance with fundamental principles
requiring both an act and intent to constitute crime.70
While such a test would have a sounder foundation than those now
existing, it is doubtful whether it would lead to radically different re-
67. State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931) held that insanity may have the
effect of reducing homicide to voluntary manslaughter.
68. In negligent crimes, the actor has not actual criminal intent, but only has a care-
less or reckless state of mind dangerous to the life and safety of others. But in these cases,
insanity should also be a defense where it has the effect of eliminating "knowledge" or
"wilfulness" or other mental element required to constitute the crime. There is some con-
fusion in the law today with reference to the amount of knowledge an actor must possess
to be guilty of a negligent crime. Cf. Radin, Intent, Criminal in 8 ENcyc. Soc. Scr. 126
(1932) ; J. W. C. Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Conmon Law, 6 CAM,. L. J.
31 (1936), reprinted in THE MoDERn API'oAcH TO CRIMINAL LAW 195 (1945).
69. Vance v. Comm., 254 Ky. 667, 72 S.W.2d 43 (1934) ; State v. Sprouse, 63 Idaho
166, 118 P.2d 378 (1941). The modern English cases hold that if the accused was too intoxi-
cated to be aware of the danger, the killing is manslaughter, not murder. Rex v. Meade,
[1909] 1 K.B. 895; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, [1920] A.C. 479.
70. The committee proposed a "Criminal Responsibility Bill," the first section of
which read:
"Sec. 1. When Mental Disease a Defense. No person shall hereafter be con-
victed of any criminal charge when at the time of the act or omission alleged
against him he was suffering from mental disease and by reason of such mental
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sults. The most common formulation of the right-and-wrong test is
that a person is not punishable if at the time of the act he did not know
the nature and quality of the act he was committing or, knowing it, did
not know that it was wrong. One who lacked comprehension of the
nature and quality of his act cannot be said to have had any intent with
regard to that act, and to this extent the two tests are identical. Also,
the irresistible impulse test is comprehended in the "intent" test, for
one acting under an irresistible impulse is not acting by free will or
intent, but by some abnormal compulsion independent of his will or
intention.
There are, however, some situations where the two tests are not
identical. For example: defendant kills a man, intending to kill him,
under an insane delusion that the deceased is an agent of the devi1
whom he, defendant, has been divinely commanded to kill. Under the
intent rule, defendant is presumably guilty, for he had the requisite
intent. But under the right-and-wrong test as applied by courts inter-
preting "right-and-wrong" to mean voral as distinguished from legal
right and wrong, this would be a defense.71 The right-and-%rong test
would in this situation be the more liberal and humanitarian, and as
there is probably universal agreement that any new test should not
serve to restrict the defense of insanity, application of the intent rule
would be unfortunate. On the other hand, while the intent test will
generally be the more liberal, the suggestion that it will open up a new
test of insanity is not alarming, for the rule could have little effect
beyond the first degree murder situation to which it has thus far been
largely limited. Specifically, the only situations in which the "intent"
test would be more liberal than the existing tests would, in addition to
murder, be those where a person is charged with one act "with intent
to" effect some additional purpose not inherent in the act itself, as
assault with intent to kill or rape, or burglary, which is a breaking and
entering with intent to commit a felony (or a misdemeanor under some
statutes). In crimes of that type, there is perhaps room to argue that
although defendant knew the nature and quality of the act (the as-
sault, the breaking and entering) and knew that it was wrong (and
so was not irresponsible under the right and wrong test), he lacked
disease he did not have the particular state of mind that must accompany such act
or omission in order to constitute the crime charged."
See Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30 Hnv. L. REv. 535 (1917) ; Keedy,
Criminal Responsibility of the Insanc-A Reply to Professor Ballantine, 12 J. Cr=. I-
& CsaxmzowY 14 (1921) ; also Keedy, Tests of Criminal Responsibility of the Insane, 1
J. Cims. L. & CpansooiGy 394 (1910).
71. Wrong was held to mean moral wrong in People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110
N.E. 945 (1915). In most jurisdictions, the courts have not clearly distinguished between
moral and legal wrong in formulating the test. See NVErHom -, INsA,;= As A Durmsz
iN CRimiNAL LAw 41-2 (1933).
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mental capacity to form the intent to kill, or to plan the felony. Even
here, a liberal interpretation of the right-and-wrong test would permit
holding that one who committed an assault likely to prove fatal but
who did not actually intend to kill, because too mentally deficient to
form such intent, did not know the nature and quality of the act he was
committing-i.e., did not know he was committing an assault witl
intent to kill.
7 2
If the doctrine is extended to cases other than murder in the first
degree, it may be suggested that the doctrine would result in mentally
disordered criminals receiving shorter prison terms and being turned
loose on society sooner than the sane and perhaps less dangerous crim-
inals. This objection was in fact raised in a lower Pennsylvania court
decision, where the court said: 73
"It is apparent that one who is a mental defective, who has
criminal tendencies, and who has committed what would be un-
questionably first degree murder were he normal, is a lasting
social menace. His condition is unlike that produced by intoxica-
tion, which is only temporary. All such should be permanently
confined either in prison or in a hospital unless other legislative
provision shall be made for their permanent confinement. It would
seem that the protection of human society should be the con-
trolling idea in dealing with them. Acceptance here of the doctrine
of reduced responsibility, as in intoxication cases, urged by the
defense, means that after a period of years any such defendant
surviving at the expiration of sentence for second degree murder
will be turned loose on society. It may be logical, as aforesaid, to
do so, but not practical, nor would it be an act of kindness to him."
But if an acquittal by reason of insanity must be specifically stated
by the jury to be for that reason, 74 why should not a reduction in the
degree of the crime for reason of mental disorder similarly be specified?
Whether a defendant is wholly acquitted of arson, for instance, because
the jury believed that on account of mental defect or disorder, he did
not have the intent to burn a building, or is found guilty of murder in
the second degree because mental disorder made him incapable of
deliberation and premeditation-in either case, the jury should explain
that their verdict was based on such a finding of mental condition. The
judge should have power to order the defendant confined for the period
proper as punishment for the offense of which he has been found guilty,
if any, and in addition, retained for medical care until safe to be at
72. See People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915).
73. Commonvealth v. Scott, 14 Pa. D. & C. 191, 198 (1930).
74. In at least 39 states and the District of Columbia, where the jury acquits on the
ground of insanity, that fact is required to appear in the verdict. W m'ora, op. cit. s pra
note 71, at 262.
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large. This procedure could probably be adopted in most states without
any additional statutory authority,75 and would be preferable to those
now employed.
VI
The theory that mental disorder, though not so pronounced as to
come within the tests of criminal insanity, may nevertheless negative
the particular intent requisite to the crime charged, will continue to
make progress in the courts. This is so because it rests upon basic
principles "long established and deep rooted." Its logic has not yet
been refuted by any court, and it will not permanently be disposed of
by mere summary rejection.
75. It is true that the requirement of a special verdict of "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity" is statutory; at common law, a person found to have been mentally irresponsible
at the time of the act was entitled to an unconditional acquittal. The great majority of
states now require that where the jury acquits on the ground of insanity, that fact should
appear in the verdict. But even where no such express provisions exist, the practice is al-
most universal to instruct to the same effect. On such an acquittal, the statutes usually
require or authorize the trial judge to order the defendant committed until he recovers his
sanity. WEIHOF-N, op. cit. mtpra note 71, at 266-78. In four states and in the federal
courts there is no legislation to meet the situation. But it seems that at common law the
judge had power to order such a defendant kept in confinement, although the only place
where he had power to order him confined was the jail Id. at 275 n105. In Georgia, the
practice is to regard such a verdict as the equivalent of a finding of a lunacy commission,
and defendant is automatically committed. GLL.ECE, MEif"rAL DrsonDn A:.D THr Cnn -A:,
LAw 398 (1925). In Texas, a person acquitted by reason of insanity may have a complaint
filed against him asking his commitment. WE0rHoFE, op. cit. sipra at 276. Courts vould
probably have no hesitation in devising a similar arrangement in cases where a person is
acquitted of the higher degree of crime because of mental unsoundness, but convicted in a
lower degree. The court could in the sentence order him confined, and upon release from
penal servitude, turned over to the hospital authorities, on the theory that the jury's verdict
not only determined his guilt but also his committability.
